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In choosing where to invest, firms seek out information on a set of possible locations. 
Information asymmetries may make country visibility particularly important in decisions 
to locate investment abroad. We develop a country visibility index based on international 
news stories in The Economist, and show that broad country visibility is at least as 
important in attracting foreign direct investment as other specific investment promotion 
activities or proxies for information frictions. Controlling for standard gravity model 
determinants of foreign direct investment, we find that greater visibility of developing 
countries, in particular lower-middle and low income countries, increases the investment 
that they receive from US multinational corporations.  
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“The good news is that transparency can work. When information is relevant, 
standardised and public, it fosters intelligent decision-making.” 
(The Economist, Economics Focus, Feb 19th 2009) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International trade and capital flows have become increasingly important in today’s 
integrated world economy. As one particularly vital type of capital flow, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) has been seen as both a response to, and a cause of, globalization and growth. In choosing 
where to invest, firms take into account a wide variety of factors, including the expected costs and 
benefits of investing in a particular location. To assess the expected costs and benefits, investors 
seek out information on a set of possible locations. Information asymmetries may exist, however, 
that make such assessments difficult. These information asymmetries are thought to be more 
extreme at the international level than at the domestic level. Thus, publicly available information 
is likely to play a particularly important role in decisions to assess markets for locating investment 
abroad. News stories, in particular, may raise awareness of a given country, thus leading managers 
to allocate more market research to that country, ultimately increasing that country’s chances of 
receiving FDI.  
To examine this question, whether country visibility in the news increases FDI, we employ 
a country visibility index based on international news articles in The Economist. This visibility 
index provides a measure of the frequency with which countries appear in the news. We estimate 
the impact of country visibility on FDI flows from the US using a gravity model approach that 
accounts for a wide range of standard determinants of FDI flows. We assume that firm managers 
in the US choose where to locate foreign investment abroad and gather information on the expected 
costs and benefits of investing in particular countries. This information gathering, however, is 
costly and is typically limited to a short list of countries. Thus, the question remains: what gets a 




for the short list. The visibility index that we employ attempts to measure this awareness. While 
not a direct measure of information, this index may provide an adequate proxy for country visibility 
to decision makers in US multinational corporations (MNCs) given the wide readership of The 
Economist among managers and professionals in North America.  
Taking the visibility measure to the data, we explore the impact of greater visibility on FDI 
flows. Ideally, we would like to measure directly the investment decision by managers, in order to 
test whether the visibility of a particular country increases the probability of being selected as an 
investment location for FDI. Since we do not have data on this direct investment decision, we infer 
this choice using the amount of investment flows at the aggregate level.  Thus, the specific 
hypothesis tested is whether greater country visibility, as captured by a higher count of news stories 
over the year, has a positive impact on international capital flows through increased awareness 
about potential FDI location sites.  
Conditioning on a variety of widely used explanatory variables for FDI flows, we find that 
country visibility plays a significant role as an additional determinant of FDI flows. In particular, 
developing countries significantly benefit from greater visibility. Conditional on a set of covariates 
shown to be important in previous literature, we find that those developing countries that receive 
greater news coverage in The Economist receive greater FDI from US MNCs. Rather than “no 
news is good news,” therefore, our findings suggest that “more news is good news” for developing 
countries.  
To ensure that our findings are not contaminated by endogeneity, we also employ a set of 
instrumental variables (IVs). The IV results are strongly supportive of our baseline findings. 
Overall, our baseline and IV results suggest that country visibility is at least as important as that 




using distance or other proxies of information frictions (see Daude and Fratzscher, 2008).        
Our paper contributes to the broad literature that examines the determinants of FDI capital 
flows across countries. It is most closely related to recent work that highlights the importance of 
information and information asymmetries in international capital flows. Among these studies 
Harding and Javorcik (2011) examine the role that investment promotion agencies (IPAs) play in 
attracting FDI to a country. Using survey data on investment promotion activities at the sectoral 
level, they show that investment promotion activities aimed at particular sectors are associated 
with higher FDI inflows from the US. Their findings suggest that IPAs increase the amount of FDI 
in particular to developing countries, where information is usually harder to obtain.  Focusing on 
another information channel, Javorcik et al. (2011) examine how migrant networks in the US affect 
the stock of US FDI in their country of origin. They employ a large set of IVs in this paper to 
address the potential for endogeneity. Their estimation results suggest that diasporas can 
significantly contribute to the FDI in their country of origin by serving as information channels 
about investment opportunities abroad. 
Recent literature has augmented the standard set of FDI determinants to highlight the 
effects of information asymmetries on both FDI and other forms of capital flows. Portes, Rey, and 
Oh (2001) and Portes and Rey (2005) show that a gravity model (which relies on size and distance 
as explanatory variables) explains international trade in financial assets at least as well as trade in 
goods. Applied to trade in goods, distance has been used in the gravity model as a proxy for 
transportation costs. Applied to trade in assets, however, distance may be a proxy for informational 
frictions. Portes, Rey, and Oh (2001) concentrate on portfolio equity trade, corporate bonds, and 
treasury bonds while Portes and Rey (2005) concentrate on portfolio equity flows, with both papers 




Daude and Fratzscher (2008) use information and host-country institutional variables to explain 
the composition of capital flows across borders, focusing on bilateral stocks of FDI, portfolio 
equity and debt, and loans for 77 countries. They use geographic distance, the amount of telephone 
traffic between countries, and trade in newspapers as alternative proxies for information frictions 
in their study of the composition of cross-border flows. Their results indicate a pecking order of 
capital such that information frictions play a larger role for FDI and loans than for portfolio 
holdings. In particular, they find that distance (their primary proxy for information) has a larger 
impact on FDI stocks than on portfolio equity or debt securities.  
Our specification focuses explicitly on FDI flows, rather than on portfolio equity or debt, 
and we utilize a different proxy for information than those used by the above studies. The count of 
news stories allows us to generate a visibility index that is unrelated to geographic distance. While 
geographic distance may proxy some forms of informational frictions, these frictions may be 
overcome somewhat by media attention. We measure media attention directly and assess its impact 
on FDI flows while also controlling for the distance between countries. 
Utilizing the idea that news conveys information pertinent to investment decisions, 
Veldkamp (2006, p. 22) argues that “when countries appear in the news more often, they should 
have higher asset prices, on average, because the information conveyed in the news stories 
decreases the investment risk.” Similarly, Barber and Odean (2008) focus on the stock purchase 
decision of individual investors and show that attention determines the choice set while preferences 
determine the choice. Here, attention determines the choice set of where to locate FDI while 
fundamentals determine the choice actually taken. Thus, in our regression equation we take into 
account the more traditional trade determinants of FDI, including variables of size and distance as 




recent approaches, while focusing on the impact of news counts on FDI flows.  
In section II, we describe the data, with particular attention on how we form the country 
visibility index. We also set up our basic econometric approach, describing the underlying 
regression function. In section III, we present the baseline estimation results along with a range of 
robustness tests, including the incorporation of IVs to address issues of endogeneity. Section IV 
concludes. 
II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
In this section, we first describe our approach in measuring country visibility, which is the 
independent variable of interest in this paper. Then, we describe our measure for FDI flows, which 
is the dependent variable of interest. We also provide our basic econometric approach and justify 
our model selection by describing the control covariates, which include an augmented set of 
controls in addition to those from the standard gravity approach applied to FDI flow. We then 
conclude this section by describing our identification strategy. 
The Country Visibility Index 
The country visibility index is based on a count of all stories in the US print editions of 
The Economist during a given year. We have collected this data for the years 2002 and 2003. We 
create this index by aggregating the number of articles on a specific country for each year. 
The Economist provides comprehensive business and financial analysis, along with 
political commentary. This magazine is a useful media outlet for the purpose of this research. First, 
it has wide readership in the US. The total average paid circulation of the North American edition 
of The Economist, most of which is read in the US, reached about 403,000 copies during the six 
months ended in June 2002 and about 437,000 copies during the six months ended in December 




Economist's total audience in 2002 and 2003.1 
Second, The Economist is likely to be read by the decision makers in US MNCs. In 2002 
and 2003, the median household income of The Economist's audience is estimated to be about 
$110,000. About 60% of its readers identify themselves as Managers or Professionals.2 In 
particular, about 20% of its readers hold Top Managerial Positions in 2002 and 2003.3  As the 
president of The Economist Group Media Businesses, Paul Rossi, indicates: “[The Economist has] 
reached CEOs and politicians and financiers around the world. And that is, in some sense, an 
aspiration that we promote in our advertising. So, one of our tag lines is: It's lonely at the top, but 
at least there's something to read” (Langfitt, 2006). Although this magazine is widely read by 
decision makers in the US, we do not assume that the management body of all US MNCs are 
reading The Economist. Rather, the news reported by The Economist indicates the type and focus 
of stories that are available to US managers, who may be utilizing a wide range of news sources. 
Relative to other countries, the number of news stories about a given country in The Economist is 
an indicator of the general media focus on that country in each year.   
Third, The Economist is a weekly magazine, which reduces the chance of double counting 
the same news event. A daily newspaper, such as the Wall Street Journal or the Financial Times, 
may provide an alternative visibility index but would be subject to a greater chance of double 
counting since a single news event may be reported for subsequent days in a row. Using a 
composite site, such as LexisNexis, would also entail multiple counts of the same news story as 
multiple news sources may report the same story at the same time.  
                                                          
1In email correspondence, the staff members at The Economist Group provided an estimate of the total audience of The 
Economist, which is about 852,000 for 2002 and 2003. 
2Information obtained via email exchange with the staff members at The Economist Group. 
3These positions include C-Suite, President, Vice President, Treasurer, Chairman of the Board, Member of the Board, 
Comptroller, General Manager, Owner-Partner, or Manager, with individual earnings of at least $35,000. Information obtained 




We create a quantitative measure of country visibility by counting the number of articles 
on a specific country in each issue. We then add these up over the year in order to match the country 
visibility data to annual flows of direct investment abroad. We determine the primary country focus 
(and secondary if the article content appears to be evenly split) by reading the title and the body of 
each article. We count stories from all sections, except the US section. If the article does not have 
a clear country focus, we count the story but do not assign it to a particular country. Counting the 
number of articles on a specific country in this fashion enables us to precisely identify the country 
focus of each article, which minimizes the possibility of measurement error in the independent 
variable of interest. 
We also categorize each story according to its main focus: economic, political, or social. 
Economic stories are categorized based on providing concrete economic data, descriptions of 
economic systems, clear discussion of economic policies, or the effects of economics on particular 
industries or firms. Political stories are categorized based on descriptions of political parties, 
elections, or politicians. Social stories are any that are not categorized as economic or political, 
but largely consist of stories on society at large. 
This approach in data collection may greatly improve our measurement of country 
visibility. However, it has its own shortcoming. For this study, we survey two years of publications 
thoroughly, which results in a well-measured set of data but limits the time dimension of the 
collected dataset. We find it costly to increase the time dimension while keeping the quality of 
measurement intact. Given this trade-off, we emphasize better measurement to avoid any bias 
caused by measurement error, but the resulting dataset has a relatively small time dimension.  
We use the count of stories to capture the broad visibility of countries available in a public 




emphasis for a country, we view such judgment as purely subjective. Further, such judgment may 
be firm or industry specific. For example, an article highlighting that a country’s GDP has 
increased may be read as positive as it indicates faster economic growth, leading to higher firm 
profits from FDI as consumers have greater incomes to spend. Such an increase in GDP, however, 
could be read as negative as the cost of inputs, such as wages, may also rise.  Further, the 
assessment of news may depend on the expectations previously held by investors. A reported 
increase in GDP may be below the expected increase and thus be characterized by an investor as 
negative while we would erroneously categorize it as a positive news story. Political changes in a 
country make this judgment particularly difficult. We include examples of stories and their 
categorization in the appendix to highlight the difficulty in judging the type of news presented. 
Consequently, we retain a focus on the count of stories, where the visibility index is a broad 
measure used to indicate the availability of information on a country. The way we handle the FDI 
capital flows may alleviate the concern over being unable to capture the positive/negative content 
of a story. We focus on direct investment abroad by US firms, utilizing Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) data on FDI. In particular, we use the values the BEA reports as capital flows.4 
Measured FDI flows may be positive (indicating investment abroad) or negative (indicating the 
reversal of previous flows). In the regression analysis, we use the absolute value of capital flows 
as the dependent variable. As independent variables, along with the lagged number of news counts, 
we include a dummy variable for negative capital flows and an interaction term between the 
negative flow dummy and the log of the lagged number of news counts. Although the dependent 
variable is measured in absolute value, we are able to test whether the negative capital flows 
respond differently to the country visibility index, potentially capturing the effect from more 
                                                          




favorable versus less favorable news on a country.  
We view the count of stories as an indicator for awareness of a country, rather than 
providing fundamental business statistics or cost comparisons across countries. Thus, it makes 
sense to think of the visibility index as helping place a country on the short-list for consideration 
for investment. Once on the short-list, the firm would then gather additional data on the costs and 
benefits of locating production in the country. Our approach is similar to that in Veldkamp (2006, 
p. 19), who uses the number of Financial Times stories on 23 emerging markets as “a proxy for 
the extent to which information about a market is easily accessible from any number of high-
demand, low-cost information sources.” She finds that high news levels are associated with high 
asset price levels. While Veldkamp associates the number of news stories with a country’s asset 
prices, we associate our measure with FDI capital flows. Further, our news variable plays a similar 
role to that in Barber and Odean (2008), who examine stock purchasing behavior, by focusing 
attention on a particular country. Greater attention means that a country is more likely to appear in 
the investor’s choice set and thus is more likely to be chosen for FDI than a country that does not 
appear in the choice set. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the country visibility index both with and without 
the UK included in the sample. For this table we only include those countries that are used in our 
baseline regressions. Thus, the US is excluded. The UK is over-sampled since each story in the 
Britain regional section is counted as an individual story about the UK. Thus, all regressions have 
been estimated both with and without the UK included in the sample. After the UK, the countries 
receiving the next highest values for count for 2002 are Japan (146 stories), Germany (131 stories), 
France (105 stories), China (97 stories), India (59 stories), Israel (59 stories), and Italy (59 stories), 




France (87 stories), India (73 stories), and Canada (66 stories).5 
The variable News Count indicates the overall count of articles on a particular country 
during 2002 and 2003. We employ log(News Count+1) for each country as our country visibility 
index, where we have added one to all observations before taking logs. If a country does not appear 
in The Economist, it is given a count of zero, indicating zero visibility via this source, allowing us 
the greatest country coverage. 
Using news stories to characterize awareness is certainly not new. What is new, however, 
is the application specifically to FDI flows. For example, the previous literature has linked news 
stories to investors’ trading behavior (Barber and Odean 2008; Nofsinger 2001), stock market 
trading volume (Onder and Simga-Mugan 2006), volatility in financial markets (Janssen 2004; 
Onder and Simga-Mugan 2006; Mondria and Quintana-Domeque 2007), country fund asset values 
(Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman 1998), and sovereign bond spreads (Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh 
2006). We use these studies as a guide in calculating our country visibility index. Our focus is 
unique and contributes to this literature by exploring the impact of news on FDI flows, which 
combine a financial variable with a real decision of where to locate production activity. 
We expect that greater coverage in The Economist increases awareness of a country, which 
in turn leads to greater FDI flows to that country. This approach does not discount the additional 
information that investment managers use in choosing where to locate FDI. The final decision is 
based on expected profitability of such investment. Greater awareness of a country, however, may 
help a country make it on a short list of countries on which the firm would conduct further market 
analysis. While we do not observe the short list of countries, we observe the flow of news that may 
make it more likely for a country to appear on a manager’s short list. Those countries that are short 
                                                          




listed more frequently are more likely to receive FDI flows relative to those that are not short 
listed. 
FDI Data 
Since the visibility index is designed to measure public visibility of countries to US 
managers deciding where to locate foreign subsidiaries, we focus on FDI outflows from the US. 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reports all countries for which there are FDI flows in a 
given year.6 Specifically, we use the BEA direct investment capital flows, defined as the “funds 
that US parent companies provide to their foreign affiliates (outflows) net of funds that foreign 
affiliates provide to their US parents (inflows)”. We focus on direct investment from the US 
(denoted as “without current-cost adjustment”), which “arise from transactions that increase US 
assets or decrease US liabilities.” Note that direct investment capital flows consist of equity capital, 
intercompany debt, and reinvested earnings.7 
Based on the above definitions of capital flows, reported capital flows from the US may be 
positive or negative. It has been standard to truncate the negative values.8 Recent work, however, 
has accounted for negative capital outflows by counting them as inflows.9 This approach implies 
that the decisions governing inflows and outflows are the same. Since we focus on the decisions 
of US managers, we only examine capital flows from the US (and not FDI flows into the US from 
                                                          
6The BEA uses three specific codes for the non-availability of FDI data for certain countries: an “n.s.” indicates the FDI data are 
zero or included elsewhere, a “star” indicates the FDI data are small (non-zero between -$500,000 and + $500,000), a “D” 
indicates disclosure would violate the privacy of individual investing firms. To achieve the greatest country coverage, we include 
the “n.s.” values as zero and “star” values as $500,000. However, the “D” values remain somewhat problematic since there is no 
indication of size or value of these variables. There are more “D” values using the 2004 capital flows compared to the 2003 
capital flows; some of these values may by arguably large, since those with a “D” for 2004 include Australia, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore, among others. Following Harding and Javorcik (2011, p. 1455), we set the “D” values as missing. For the 2003 capital 
flows, there are 13 “n.s.” values, 26 “star” values, and 23 “D” values. For the 2004 capital flows, there are 7 “n.s.” values, 18 
“star” values, and 40 “D” values. 
7 We employ aggregate variations reported by the BEA since we do not have access to data from a well-stratified sample of 
multinational firms in the US, which would allow us to capture the effect of country visibility on changes in firms’ external assets 
or liabilities. 
8 For instance, Harding and Javorcik (2011) follow Blonigen and Wang (2004) and Eichengreen and Tong (2005) and truncate all 
negative values of FDI flows to US$0.1. 




other countries). Consequently, we take a different approach here and first focus on the absolute 
value of flows so that outflows and the reversal of such flows are handled identically. We then 
explicitly ask whether the negative values respond differently by including a dummy variable equal 
to one for all negative values to test whether the regression line intercept differs. Further, we allow 
this dummy variable to interact with our country visibility index to test whether the slope of the 
regression line differs.10 
 The country visibility index covers all editions of The Economist in 2002 and 2003. The 
FDI flows that we focus on are the 2003 and 2004 flows. Since FDI decisions may take time to 
implement, we examine whether country visibility in a given year (e.g., 2002) is likely to affect 
future FDI location decisions (e.g., FDI flows for 2003). In the benchmark regression, we have 
153 observations for the regression on 2003 capital flows and 138 observations for the regression 
on 2004 capital flows (see the appendix for the list of included countries). To increase the number 
of countries and observations, we present results for the data pooled together so that we have at 
most 291 observations.11 Given that others have shown that the impacts of various variables on 
FDI flows may differ for developing countries, we split the full sample into two sub-samples based 
on income levels: the low and lower-middle income countries are grouped together while the 
upper-middle and high income countries are grouped together. For the observations in the pooled 
data estimation, Figure 1 plots the FDI flows from the US to other countries against the variations 
in their visibility index. There appears to be a positive correlation between the two variables in 
both sub-samples of countries. We examine this unconditional correlation more fully by 
controlling for a wide range of covariates in our regression analysis. 
                                                          
10Using the log of the absolute value of FDI flows where the negative flows are given a negative sign after taking the log 
provides a similar coefficient on the news count variable but does not allow us to consider the differing impacts on the reversal of 
previous FDI flows. 




The Regression Function 
We use the pooled data to examine the influence of the constructed country visibility index 
on the flow of FDI from the US to other countries by employing the following regression: 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋′𝑖,𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡             (1) 
where FDIi,t is the log of the absolute value of FDI flows from the US to country i at time t, and 
NewsCounti,t-1 is the log of the lagged number of news counts for country i. In order to perform 
the log transformations, we add 1 to the value of capital flows and to the value of news counts to 
include those countries with zero capital flows or zero news counts.  
The baseline empirical specification includes the country visibility index and a standard 
set of explanatory variables thought to influence the location of FDI. These explanatory covariates 
(Xi,t) include a set of conventional gravity model variables. In our most parsimonious 
specification, we control for GDP, distance from the US, GDP growth rate, and GDP per capita to 
capture the basic gravity model variables. Except for the growth rate, all gravity variables are in 
log form. To take into account the differences between the positive and negative capital flows at 
time t, we also include a dummy variable for negative flows along with an interaction term between 
the negative flow dummy and the log of lagged number of news counts for country i. As sensitivity 
analysis, we add additional control covariates to Xi,t including a dummy variable for all countries 
with the same legal origin as the US (i.e., countries that have a British legal origin), a dummy 
variable for all countries that have common language with the US (i.e., countries that speak 
English), a NAFTA dummy variable (for Canada and Mexico), and three dummy variables for the 
European Union (i.e., a dummy for 15 members of the EU in 2003, a dummy for 10 countries that 




includes a dummy variable for 2004 and a vector of ones for the constant term. Ɛi,t is the error 
term under the usual assumptions. 
Global FDI patterns are often examined from trade and/or financial perspectives. There is 
a rich tradition examining the determinants of FDI stocks from a trade perspective (e.g., Aizenman 
and Spiegel, 2006; Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Wheeler and Mody, 1992). Among the 
determinants are the cost of locating and producing in a particular country, the size of markets, the 
distance between the parent country and the host country, as well as other trade barriers.12 From a 
financial perspective, other influences on FDI flows may include barriers to international capital 
flows (capital controls) and institutional variables, such as the stability of governments and the 
enforcement of private property rights (e.g., Harding and Javorcik, 2011). Other covariates that 
capture common language, legal origin, and regional characteristics are also used in these studies.  
Recently, a number of model selection studies have examined a large set of covariates that 
have been used in previous empirical analyses of FDI. Notably, Chakrabarti (2001), Blonigen and 
Piger (2014), Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski (2012), and Jordan and Lenkoski (2012) employ 
different model selection techniques to identify the key determinants of FDI.  Chakrabarti (2001) 
employs Extreme Bound Analysis to identify the robust determinants of FDI.  Blonigen and Piger 
(2014) and Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski (2012) employ Bayesian Model Averaging to account 
for model uncertainty. Given the large share of missing observations in FDI flows, Eicher, 
Helfman, and Lenkoski (2012) also incorporate the selection bias correction proposed by Heckman 
(1979) into their model selection procedure.13 Relying on their findings, we choose a set of control 
                                                          
12In a paper that examines the impact of tax treaties on direct investment positions, Blonigen and Davies (2004) provide a nice 
description of the empirical specifications of the application of gravity models versus the Markusen and Maskus (2002) model of 
vertical versus horizontal FDI. 
13 Jordan and Lenkoski (2012) use the same set of data, proposing an alternative method to improve the precision of the 




covariates that have been shown to be among the most important determinants of FDI flows while 
considering the possibility of selection bias.  
The results of the above model selection studies illustrate the importance of conventional 
gravity model variables, which reinforce some of the findings in the studies that examine the 
determinants of FDI from a trade perspective. In particular, they motivate those studies in which a 
gravity equation is employed to explain the variations in FDI (e.g., Head and Ries, 2008). In our 
most parsimonious regression function, therefore, the gravity model variables, including host 
country GDP, distance from the US, GDP growth rate, and GDP per capita, are included in Xi,t. In 
subsequent estimations, we also add an augmented set of covariates to Xi,t, which are described 
above. 
Identification 
Controlling for a large set of covariates, our working hypothesis is that greater country 
visibility, which raises awareness about a given country, is likely to lead to greater investment by 
US MNCs in that particular country. Thus, we expect the primary coefficient of interest, α, to be 
positive. The parameter of interest can be identified due to the timing of the underlying regression 
function. We assume that country visibility contributes to FDI flows with a lag. In our regression 
function, the error term captures the unexplained variations in FDI at time t, which are expected 
to be orthogonal to the variations in our country visibility index at time t-1. Therefore, a shock to 
the error term at time t is expected to affect FDI contemporaneously, while it has no effect on the 
lagged visibility measures.  
An important consideration in our identification strategy is whether or not the visibility 
index is influenced by FDI flows. This is a broader question as to country focus in The Economist. 




Nonetheless, we utilize The Economist because it appears to have broad country coverage each 
week, with specific regional sections always present in each issue (the regional sections are United 
States, The Americas, Asia, Middle East and Africa, Europe, and Britain). While the specific 
countries covered in the regional sections may change each week, the existence of the different 
sections indicates that a broad focus of countries is taken in each issue. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the editors at The Economist plan what they cover, acting as a filter for their readers. 
It also appears that the ongoing events, new data, and trendspotting topics are likely to affect the 
editors' plan for each issue (The Economist, 2013).  Hence, one can imagine a situation in which 
the variations in the country visibility index are endogenous to the variations in FDI. For example, 
consider a hypothetical country that introduces some business-friendly regulations at time t. This 
shock is expected to contribute to the FDI from the US to that country at time t, without having 
any impact on the visibility of that country at time t-1. However, the new regulations might have 
already been discussed in the media at time t-1. If such a story appears in The Economist, it is 
reflected in the variations of the lagged country visibility index. The news coverage about that 
particular story at time t-1 may have some predictability power for the new regulation at time t. 
This correlation may go either way: greater media attention may encourage or discourage the 
policy makers in the host countries to put the new set of regulations in place. In this case, the 
contemporaneous error term may depend on the lagged visibility measure. Under these 
circumstances, we are unable to identify the parameter of interest by solely relying on the timing 
structure of our regression function, and the resulting estimations may be biased. Consequently, 
we employ the exogenous variations in a set of IVs as we explore an alternative identification 
strategy as a robustness check in section III. 




capture a causal relationship. We neither have access to a randomized trial, nor do we have access 
to any natural experiments. Also, to test whether greater visibility puts a country on a short list for 
investment, we need to have access to detailed firm level observations. We do not have access to 
such data, which limits our ability to test for causality directly. Nevertheless, our main 
identification strategy and IV tests enable us to estimate the effect of lagged country visibility on 
FDI without any bias caused by endogeneities.14  
III. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
In this section, we first describe the results of our baseline estimations. Then, we divide 
our sample by country income groups to examine the effect of country visibility on the FDI outflow 
from the US to developing countries. We also examine the importance of economic news, 
compared to political and social news stories. We conclude this section by reporting the results of 
our IV estimations, which address additional endogeneity concerns and generally confirm the 
baseline results.15  
Baseline Estimation Results 
In the most parsimonious empirical specification (Table 2, columns I-1 and I-2), we 
estimate the effect of the number of news counts for country i at time t-1 on the FDI flows between 
the US and country i at time t. We use the count data pooled for the years 2002 and 2003 along 
with the FDI data pooled for the years 2003 and 2004.16 For this estimation we control for GDP, 
GDP growth rate, and GDP per capita of country i at time t as well as the distance between the US 
and country i.  
The estimation results reported in Table 2 suggest that the absolute value of FDI flows from 
                                                          
14 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
15 In the appendix, we report another set of results in which institutional variations are used as additional control variables.  
Adding these institutional controls does not change the results reported here.  
16The same pattern emerges when we estimate the above regression function for each year 2003 and 2004 separately, although 




the US to other countries is greater for those countries that appear more frequently in The 
Economist, implying that greater visibility of a country may put it on the short list for the FDI 
conducted by US MNCs. This effect is evident even after we control for a large set of covariates, 
including the gravity model controls. To ensure that the baseline results, reported in column I-1 of 
Table 2, are not driven by the UK, we exclude the UK from the sample. The same pattern emerges, 
as can be seen in column I-2 of Table 2.  
Since we pool data for the years 2003 and 2004, we also include a time dummy variable, 
which takes one for 2004, and zero for 2003. We incorporate further normalizations by controlling 
for more detailed country characteristics to ensure that the baseline results are not sensitive. The 
results, with the UK in column II-1or without the UK in column II-2, are similar to the above. This 
set includes a dummy for British legal origin, a dummy for English as the common language, a 
dummy for NAFTA countries, and three different dummies for different groups of EU countries. 
For the purpose of our estimations, the FDI flows, lagged news counts, GDP, distance, and GDP 
per capita are transformed into logs following the usual convention. The appendix contains specific 
variable definitions and sources. 
Table 2 shows that the flow of direct investment to a country is significantly and positively 
related to visibility of that country. The coefficient on Lagged News Count, which is our measure 
of country visibility, is significantly different from zero and its magnitude varies in a narrow band 
between 0.33 and 0.40. To fix intuition, consider the regression in column I-1. The estimated 
coefficient on Lagged News Count is 0.40, indicating a 4 percent increase in FDI flows for a 10 
percent change in the visibility index when other covariates are kept at their mean. From the 291 
observations used in the regression, 225 observations have positive FDI. Among them, the average 




variable is associated with less than two stories.17 The average FDI flows for these observations is 
approximately $1514 million, while the median is $48 million.18 Thus, an increase of 4 percent is 
an increase in FDI of about $60.5 million for the average observation and an increase of about $1.9 
million for the median observation. 
In order to test if country visibility has different effects on the negative flows, we control 
for a negative flow dummy as well as the interaction between the number of news counts and the 
negative flow dummy.19 At time t, this dummy is equal to one when we observe a negative capital 
flow for country i (i.e., when FDI reversals occur). For negative flows, the estimated intercept 
would be equal to the original estimated intercept in the model (denoted by Constant in Table 2) 
plus the estimated coefficient for the negative flow dummy. Also, the estimated effect of visibility 
on negative FDI flows would be equal to the original estimated coefficient in the model (denoted 
by Lagged News Count in Table 2) plus the estimated coefficient for the interaction between 
negative flow dummy and the news counts.  
The contribution of country visibility to FDI flows appears to be significant only for the 
positive flows.  To illustrate this, consider (a hypothetical average) country k receiving FDI flows 
from the US at time t. The Negative Flow Dummy is equal to zero in this case, so that the estimated 
parameter associated with Lagged News Count shows the contribution of country k’s visibility to 
the FDI flow from the US to country k. The results in Table 2 show that, even after controlling for 
gravity variations, this estimated parameter is positive and statistically significant. Now consider 
(another hypothetical average) country l with negative values of FDI flows to the US at time t (i.e., 
                                                          
17Using the pooled data, we observe 153 countries in 2003 and 138 countries in 2004. The average news count for the 153 
countries in 2003 is 14.65. For the 138 countries in 2004, this average is equal to 14.56. 
18The average FDI flow for the 153 countries in 2003 is about $840 million, while the median is about $4 million. For the 138 
countries in 2004, this average is about $1460 million, while the median is about $15 million. 
19 Motivated by a point raised by an anonymous referee, we also separate the outflows and reversals of flows (i.e., negative 
flows) and estimate a modified model using only the outflows or the reversals. Though in some cases the precision of the 




a reversal of previous FDI flows from the US). Since the Negative Flow Dummy is equal to one in 
this case, the sum of the estimated parameters associated with Lagged News Count and Negative 
Flow Dummy * Lagged News Count shows the contribution of country l’s visibility to the FDI 
flow from country l to the US. We are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the sum of those 
estimated parameters is equal to zero.20 This suggests that greater visibility matters for the FDI 
outflows from the US to other countries but not for the reversal of such flows. Excluding the 
dummy variable for negative flows and its interaction with the news count measure does not affect 
the sign and the significance of the parameter of interest.21 However, in order to be able to 
distinguish between the effect of country visibility on capital outflows and inflows, we take into 
account the binary variations in negative flows (i.e. reversals) and their interaction with the 
variations in the news counts. The results indicate that greater visibility of country i at time t-1 
increases the chance of greater capital outflow from the US to country i at time t, but has no 
significant effect on the reallocation of capital from country i to the US at time t. The interpretation 
here is that US MNCs that have already invested in a country have intimate knowledge of the 
operating conditions of that country. Thus, greater visibility has no significant effect on the 
reallocation of capital from country i to the US.22    
Among the gravity variables, GDP and GDP per capita are positively correlated with the 
absolute value of capital flows while distance is negatively correlated with the absolute value of 
capital flows. As for the other control covariates, we find that on average the absolute value of FDI 
flows are greater for the year 2004. Incorporating the time dummy, therefore, we are able to control 
                                                          
20For instance, in column I-1, this value is 0.402-0.442=-0.04, which is insignificantly different from zero. 
21Detailed estimation results available upon request. 
22 Though it is evident that greater country visibility contributes to FDI flows from the US to other countries, we are unable to 
test whether this effect is through the extensive margin (i.e., entry of new US MNCs to a given country) or the intensive margin 
(i.e., increase in existing investment position made by a US MNC in a given country). Such a test requires detailed firm-level 




for the trend. We also find that the estimated parameter for the negative flow dummy is significant. 
This indicates that the absolute value of the constant term may be of lower magnitude for the 
negative flows.   
Excluding the UK has little impact on the coefficient on Lagged News Count. In the most 
parsimonious regression (columns I-1 and I-2), excluding the UK reduces the coefficient 
somewhat on Lagged News Count. In the other specifications, excluding the UK has little effect; 
we show this with columns II-1 and II-2. 
Along with the covariates included in the most parsimonious model, we further explore 
whether common legal origin impacts FDI by including a dummy variable taking the value of one 
for all countries with the same legal origin as the US (i.e., those countries also having a UK legal 
origin).23 Common language may also be important in determining where FDI locates. Thus, we 
include an English language dummy for those countries that use English (either as the official 
language or as a primary language as reported in the CIA world factbook). We also explore regional 
considerations by including a NAFTA dummy variable and three possible European Union dummy 
variables: EU1 for the 15 members of the EU in 2003, EU2 for the countries that became members 
in 2004, and EU3 for the European Union candidate countries at the time.24  
The estimated parameter of interest, shown in columns II-1 and II-2 in Table 2, is quite 
robust to this additional set of explanatory variables. Controlling for the standard gravity 
covariates, however, the additional control variables have little explanatory power. The only 
exception is the EU2 dummy. Compared to other countries that are not controlled for by NAFTA, 
EU1, and EU3 dummies, the FDI activities are estimated to be lower in Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
                                                          
23See La Porta, et al. (2008) for more information on the legal origin variable. 
24 A full list of countries that are considered for each dummy variable is included in the appendix. The countries that are included 
in the EU2 vector are likely to have appeared more often in the news during the time leading up to their membership. Further, 
they may have received more FDI flows based on their expected EU membership, which may also be the case for the countries 




Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. This does not change 
the coefficient on Lagged News Count. 
To make sure that the above results are not driven by relatively large flows, we conduct 
another test in which we only include observations where the absolute value of FDI inflows or 
outflows are less than or equal to the value of the 90th percentile. Thus, along with the UK, 
countries such as Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland 
are excluded from the sample. The results of the estimations using the smaller sample support the 
baseline results: conditional upon a wide range of covariates, greater country visibility contributes 
to FDI flows from the US to the countries in the smaller sample, but has no significant effect on 
the reversal of such flows from those countries to the US.25  
Income Groups 
Harding and Javorcik (2011) show that IPAs significantly contribute to the FDI in 
developing countries but are not effective for industrialized countries. Thus, we consider 
subsamples of our countries to examine whether news stories contribute to FDI flows only in the 
less developed countries. This hypothesis implies that greater news is providing visibility to 
countries for which information is less available. We examine the baseline estimation results across 
country groupings based on income, using the World Bank classifications of countries into high 
income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income, and low income. We present results for the 
developing countries compared to the high income countries. We also present results for the high 
and upper-middle income countries grouped together and the lower-middle and low income 
countries grouped together. While the income levels may be a somewhat arbitrary delimiter, these 
                                                          




divisions appear to be important for the impact of news on FDI flows. 
Table 3 reports the results. The coefficient on Lagged News Count for the developing 
countries, reported in column I-1, is similar to that for all countries. The results reported in column 
I-1 and column I-2 indicate a significant positive association between country visibility and FDI 
flows from the US to developing countries but not for high income countries. The positive 
association is also statistically significant for lower-middle and low income countries (column II-
1), and remains insignificant for high and upper-middle income countries (column II-2).26 As in 
the baseline results, country visibility is not a significant determinant of the FDI reversals, as the 
sum of the coefficients on Lagged News Count and Negative Flow Dummy * Lagged News Count 
is statistically not different from zero for all country income groups. 
One interpretation of this finding is that investors already may be aware of the investment 
potential in developed countries.  News stories on developing countries may have a larger impact 
in raising awareness so that articles in The Economist provide a higher marginal value. Thus, for 
the developing countries as a whole and for the low income and lower-middle income countries in 
particular, rather than “no news is good news”, we find that “more news is good news”! 
To examine the magnitude of this effect, let us consider the estimation for lower-middle 
and low income countries (column II-1). The estimated coefficient on Lagged News Count is 0.45, 
indicating a 4.5 percent increase in FDI flows from the US to lower-middle and low income 
countries for a 10 percent change in their visibility index when other covariates are kept at their 
mean. From 177 observations in the sample, 130 observations have positive FDI flows from the 
US. Among them, the average observation has a count of stories of approximately 8, thus a 10% 
change in the information variable is associated with less than one story. The average FDI flows 
                                                          
26 The same pattern emerges when we estimate our model using the FDI data for 2003 and 2004 separately, although there is 




for these observations are approximately $181 million, while the median flows are $9.5 million. 
Within this group, therefore, an increase of 4.5 percent is an increase in FDI of about $8.14 million 
for the average observation and an increase of about $0.42 million for the median observation.  
To put this number in perspective, we compare our results with those in Harding and 
Javorcik (2011), who examine the impact of IPAs on FDI flows. They ask how the existence of an 
IPA affects the FDI in the targeted sectors. Their estimations suggest that in developing countries 
targeted sectors receive about 155% higher inflows relative to non-targeted sectors. For the median 
sector-country observation, an increase of 155% translates into $17 million dollars of additional 
FDI. Given the estimated magnitude reported in Harding and Javorcik (2011), our estimation 
appears to be reasonable. 
As for the gravity control covariates, GDP continues to be a significant determinant of FDI 
flows. Except for the group of high income countries, distance is also a significant determinant, 
with greater distance associated with less FDI. Further, we find that among developing countries 
GDP per capita is also a significant determinant of FDI flows. Legal origin appears to have a 
positive impact on FDI flows for the high and upper-middle income countries. 
To test the robustness of the above results, we exclude countries with relatively large flows 
from each subsample, including only observations for which the absolute value of FDI inflows or 
outflows are less than or equal to the value of the 90th percentile. Excluding the observations with 
relatively large flows from the subsample of lower middle and low income countries, the results 
suggest that, conditional upon a wide range of covariates, greater country visibility contributes to 
FDI flows from the US to developing countries. Greater country visibility has no significant effect 
on the reversal of such flows from those countries to the US. As for developed nations, we find no 




above.27    
Type of Stories 
While we find a consistently positive effect of country visibility on FDI flows from the US 
to developing countries, our results thus far say little about the type of news that is important. 
Therefore, we modify our country visibility index by categorizing news stories as predominantly 
Economic, Political, or Social.28  
Table 4 shows that stories with a predominantly economic focus tend to have a positive 
impact on the FDI flows. This effect is particularly evident among lower-middle and low income 
countries.29 When we employ a full vector of control covariates (column II-2), for instance, we 
find that economic news counts are positively and significantly correlated with FDI outflows from 
the US to lower-middle and low income countries.30 Further, based on the negative flow interaction 
term, more news about the economic condition of developing countries matters for the FDI 
outflows from the US to those countries but not for the reversal of previous flows. Although the 
estimated parameter for Neg. Flow Dummy * Lagged Economic News Count in column II-2 is 
statistically insignificant, it is again of negative sign. More importantly, the sum of the estimated 
parameters for Lagged Economic News Count and Neg. Flow Dummy * Lagged Economic News 
                                                          
27 From the subsample of lower middle and low income countries, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, India, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and Thailand are excluded. Also, from the subsample 
of high and upper middle income countries, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK 
are excluded. Detailed estimation results are available in the appendix. 
28 As stated before, we have decided not to categorize news stories based on their tone to avoid the potential for measurement 
error. However, we acknowledge that negative news or a negative tone to a story may play a role in the response of FDI.  To 
capture this idea, we have explored results in which we include a dummy for lagged armed conflict and interact this dummy with 
lagged news count. The results are supportive of the main findings such that news stories remain a significant positive predictor 
of FDI flows for the lower middle and low income countries where there is no armed conflict. Where there is armed conflict, the 
combined coefficient (i.e., the sum of lagged visibility measure and its interaction with lagged conflict dummy) is not significant, 
indicating no response of FDI to news stories in this case. It should be noted, however, that the combined coefficient does not 
turn negative. The results are reported in the appendix. Further exploration of the tone of news coverage may be useful in future 
research. 
29Detailed estimation results for the sub-sample of high income and the full set of developing countries available upon request. 
30Similar results for the types of stories are found when we repeat our estimation for the FDI data in 2003 and 2004 separately. 
Although there is a loss of efficiency in some cases, we generally find that greater visibility of the economic conditions 




Count is statistically not different from zero.31  
The gravity control covariates (notably, GDP, distance, and GDP per capita) are significant 
and of expected sign. Conditional upon the conventional gravity variations, therefore, cross-
section differences in the visibility of economic conditions in developing countries, as measured 
by the Lagged Economic News Count, is a good predictor for the amount of FDI outflows from 
the US to those countries. Greater visibility of a developing country’s economic condition may put 
it on the short list for the FDI made by US MNCs. 
The IV Estimations 
The results reported in Table 4 suggest that stories with a predominantly economic focus 
have a positive impact on the FDI outflows from the US to lower-middle and low income countries. 
One may worry that there exist some endogeneities in our model. We minimize the potential bias 
caused by endogeneity since in our baseline regression (Equation 1) we examine the effect of the 
lagged country visibility (i.e., NewsCounti,t-1) on current investments (i.e., FDIi,t). Given the 
underlying regression function, a shock to the error term (i.e., Ɛi,t) is expected to affect the FDI 
contemporaneously, and it may have no effect on the lagged visibility measures. This timing 
structure preserves the underlying identification restriction. Nonetheless, one may imagine a case 
in which the error term is affected by the lagged country visibility. For instance, the economic 
news stories about a given country that appear in The Economist may encourage/discourage some 
regulations in that country. With a one year lag, those changes may appear as shocks to the error 
term, affecting the FDI flows. In that case, the identification restriction is not binding.   
To address the potential for endogeneity, we make use of the exogenous variations in two 
IVs to predict the variations in country visibility and estimate its effect on the FDI flows. We 
                                                          




consider the total medal counts for the winter Olympics in 2002 (Salt Lake City, US) and the 
number of natural disaster incidents in 2002 and 2003.32 Before using these variables as our IVs, 
we add one to each count and take the log. 
The two-stage least square estimations (2SLS) are reported in Table 5. For these 
estimations we use either the medal counts (in log) or the number of natural disaster incidents (in 
log) to predict the country visibility. The first stage results show that our instruments are positively 
correlated with country visibility, and the resulting parameters of interest in the second stage are 
supportive of our baseline findings. 
 As shown in columns I-1 and II-1, the total medal counts for the winter Olympics in 2002 
is positively correlated with our measure of country visibility in the full sample as well as the 
subsample of lower-middle and low income countries. In the second stage, however, country 
visibility is positively correlated with US FDI outflows only in the subsample of lower-middle and 
low income countries.33 As reported in column II-2, the estimated coefficient for Lagged News 
Count is positive and statistically different from zero, while the sum of the estimated coefficients 
for Lagged News Count and Negative Flow Dummy*Lagged News Count is statistically not 
different from zero. These estimations imply that, similar to our baseline findings, greater visibility 
contributes to the US FDI in lower-middle and low income countries, but it has no effect on the 
FDI reversals.34 
We repeat the same exercise, employing the exogenous variations in natural disasters in 
                                                          
32The data for Olympics medal counts are provided by the International Olympics Committee, and the data for the number of 
natural disaster incidents are provided by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (School of Public Health at 
Université catholique de Louvain). 
33The mean of the total medal counts for the winter Olympics in 2002 is equal to 0.95 in the full sample and 0.21 in the 
subsample of lower-middle and low income countries. The standard deviations are 3.9 and 1.43, respectively.  
34We use the exogenous variations in winter Olympics medals in 2002 to estimate the effect of country visibility in 2002 on US 
FDI flows in 2003. In terms of sign and magnitude, the results are comparable to what we find in the pooled data, as reported in 




2002 and 2003 to predict the effect of country visibility in those years on US FDI in 2003 and 
2004. As shown in columns III-1 and IV-1, natural disaster incidents are significant predictors of 
country visibility. The second stage results for the full sample, reported in column III-2, is 
comparable to what we find when we employ winter Olympics medal counts as our IV (column I-
2). However, the results for the subsample of lower-middle and low income countries, reported in 
column IV-2, is not as significant as our previous IV estimations (column II-2).35  
Given our first set of IV estimations, reported in Table 5, we employ both of our 
instruments in an IV vector to improve the precision of our IV estimations. Since we use more than 
one instrument to identify the parameter of interest in Equation 1, we employ the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique. Using GMM, we are able to estimate the 
parameters of interest of our overidentified model, and test for the exogeneity of such instruments 
using the overidentifying condition.36  
To obtain an optimal two-step GMM estimation, in which variances are the smallest, we 
employ 2SLS estimations to predict the residuals first. Using the residuals, we then form an 
optimal robust weighting matrix for our GMM estimation.37 Thus, along with the final GMM 
results, we also report the first stage correlations.  
Conditional upon a wide range of covariates, the results reported in column II-2 of Table 
6 suggest that the lagged country visibility, predicted by the exogenous variations in winter 
Olympics medals in 2002 (in log) and the number of natural disasters in 2002 and 2003 (in log), 
                                                          
35The same pattern emerges when we employ the number of natural disaster incidents to predict the effect of country visibility in 
2002 and 2003 on FDI flows in 2003 and 2004 separately.   
36Refer to Hayashi (2000, pp. 198-208) for the general formulation and definition of the GMM estimator. The GMM estimation is 
used when there are more than one identification restrictions; i.e., when the model is overidentified. Since we only assume one 
identification restriction in our baseline regression, we use OLS estimation for the baseline. Also, since we only employ one 
instrument in each of the IV estimations that are reported in Table 5, we use 2SLS in our first set of IV estimations. However, 
now that we employ more than one instrument to predict the variations in our country visibility index (i.e.: we have an 
overidentified model), we use GMM for the IV estimations that are reported in Table 6. 





contributes to the FDI made by US MNCs in lower-middle and low income countries. The 
estimated parameter for the Lagged News Count variable is insignificant when we consider the full 
sample (column I-2). Yet, it is positive and statistically significant when we only consider lower-
middle and low income countries. The sum of the estimated parameters for visibility (Lagged News 
Count) and its interaction with the negative flow dummy (Negative Flow Dummy * Lagged News 
Count), as reported in column II-2, is statistically not different from zero, which again indicates 
that greater visibility only matters for the FDI flow from the US to those countries and not for the 
FDI reversals.38  
As for the gravity control covariates, the IV estimations reported in column II-2 suggest 
that, among the lower-middle and low income countries, the GDP of a host country is positively 
correlated with the US FDI flows to that country, although the estimated parameter is significant 
only at the 15% level (p-value=14.7%). Also, greater distance negatively affects the FDI flow 
between the US and other countries. Lastly, the GDP per capita of a host country is positively 
correlated with the US FDI flows to that country. 
To make sure that our model is identified, we test the overidentifying restrictions using 
Hansen's (1982) J-statistic. The relatively high p-values, reported in column I-2 and II-2, imply 
that we are unable to reject the underlying orthogonality conditions. Thus, it is safe to assume that 
the instruments in use are exogenous to the variations in FDI, and our model is identified. 
Employing the exogenous variations in our IVs, therefore, we are able to verify that greater country 
visibility contributes to FDI by US MNCs in lower-middle and low income countries, while it has 
no significant effect on the FDI reversals. 
  
                                                          
38Although there is a loss of efficiency, the same pattern emerges when we repeat the optimal two-step GMM estimation 




IV. CONCLUSION AND SOME EXTENSIONS 
Is “no news” really “good news”? Perhaps not when it comes to FDI flows to developing 
countries, particularly to the lower-middle and low income countries. The findings of our research 
imply that for those countries “more news is good news.” To examine the impact of news stories 
on the amount of direct investment flows from the US to its investment partners, we develop a 
basic index of news stories that counts the number of articles on a particular country in The 
Economist over a year. We then use this country visibility index as an additional explanatory 
variable in a standard econometric analysis of the FDI flows from the US to other countries, 
utilizing a number of other explanatory variables to isolate the impacts of the visibility variable. 
Overall, we find strong support for a significant, positive impact of the number of stories on a 
country and FDI flows to that country.  
The estimated impact of the number of news stories on the amount of direct investment 
flows is in particular significant for the lower-middle and low income countries. For the upper-
middle and high income countries, the effect appears to be insignificant. This suggests that greater 
country visibility contributes to the direct investments made by US multinationals in developing 
countries. We also find that among different types of stories, economic news is of great importance. 
Political and social news stories do not significantly contribute to the direct investment flows. This 
suggests that greater visibility of economic conditions contributes to the FDI flows from the US. 
Since the economic news are shown to be important, we employ two instrumental variables that 
are exogenous to the variations in the FDI to make sure that the results are not biased due to some 
endogeneities. The same pattern emerges: greater country visibility of lower-middle and low 
income countries contributes to the FDI outflows from the US to those countries. 




FDI flows from the US to other countries are significantly affected by the attention paid to these 
countries by media outlets. One criticism of the approach used is that it may be useful to collect 
the visibility index over multiple years to more fully utilize the event study methodology. This 
would allow a specification based on the change in visibility (rather than the raw count of articles). 
A change in visibility may provide additional information about how changes in visibility affect 
changes in capital flows. This would be asking a somewhat more nuanced question about whether 
increases in visibility are associated with increases in capital flows. In this case, the type of 
information included in each article may become of particular importance. Given a baseline level 
of information, whether additional information on a country conforms to expectations (e.g., 
providing more favorable or less favorable information relative to expected information) is likely 
to matter. Expected information versus realized information, however, may be particularly difficult 
to measure. Thus, we focus on broad visibility, as captured by the count of stories. This allows less 
normative judgment on our part. 
FDI entails some management control of foreign operations of a subsidiary. As such, it is 
typically seen as much more stable than other forms of capital flows. This drives our choice of an 
annual index and the utilization of annual data in the initial empirical analysis. As a financial flow, 
however, FDI may react more like a portfolio flow, as firms move funds between operations at 
home and abroad, leading to greater volatility within a given year. Comparing longer-term FDI 
and information flows to shorter-term FDI and information flows may provide a compelling new 
way of looking at the question of volatile capital flows. Expanding the coverage by examining the 
level of visibility available on a daily basis using the Wall Street Journal or the Financial Times 







Aizenman, Joshua, and Mark M. Spiegel, 2006, “Institutional Efficiency, Monitoring Costs, and 
the Investment Share of FDI,” Review of International Economics, 14(4), 683–697. 
 
Audit Bureau of Circulation, 2002, “Magazine Publisher's Statement, The Economist (North 
American Edition),” Schaumburg, IL. 
 
Audit Bureau of Circulation, 2003, “Magazine Publisher's Statement, The Economist (North 
American Edition),” Schaumburg, IL. 
 
Barber, Brad M., and Terrance Odean, 2008, “All That Glitters: The Effect of Attention and News 
on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors,” Review of Financial Studies 
21(2), 785-818. 
 
Binici, Mahir, Michael Hutchison, and Martin Schindler. 2010. "Controlling capital? Legal 
restrictions and the asset composition of international financial flows". Journal of International 
Money and Finance.29 (4): 666-684.  
 
Blonigen, Bruce A., 2005, “A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI Determinants,” Atlantic 
Economic Journal 33, 383-403. 
 
Blonigen, Bruce A., and Ronald B. Davies, 2004, “The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on US FDI 
Activity,” International Tax and Public Finance 11(5), 601-22. 
 
Blonigen, Bruce A., and Jeremy Piger. 2014. "Determinants of foreign direct investment". 
Canadian Journal of Economics. 47 (3): 775-812. 
 
Blonigen, Bruce A., and Miao Wang. 2004. Inappropriate pooling of wealthy and poor countries 
in empirical FDI studies. NBER Working Paper No. 10378. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau 
of Economic Research.  
 
Chakrabarti, Avik. 2001. "The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments: Sensitivity Analyses 
of Cross-Country Regressions". Kyklos 54 (1): 89-114. 
 
Daude, Christian, and Marcel Fratzscher, 2008, “The Pecking Order of Cross-Border Investment,” 
Journal of International Economics 74, 94-119. 
 




Eichengreen, Barry J., and Hui Tong. 2005. Is China's FDI coming at the expense of other 






Eicher, T.S., L. Helfman, and A. Lenkoski. 2012. "Robust FDI determinants: Bayesian Model 
Averaging in the presence of selection bias". Journal of Macroeconomics 34 (3): 637-651. 
 
Hansen, L. P. (1982). “Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators.” 
Econometrica1029-1054. 
 
Harding, Torfinn, and Beata S. Javorcik. 2011. "Roll Out the Red Carpet and They Will Come: 
Investment Promotion and FDI Inflows". The Economic Journal121 (557): 1445-1476.  
 
Hayashi, F. (2000).Econometrics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Head, Keith, and John Ries. 2008. "FDI as an outcome of the market for corporate control: Theory 
and evidence". Journal of International Economics 74 (1): 2-20. 
 
Heckman, J.J. 1979. "Sample selection bias as a specification error". Econometrica. 47 (1): 153-
161. 
 
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, 2006, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 
September. 
 
Janssen, Gust, 2004, “Public Information Arrival and Volatility Persistence in Financial Markets,” 
The European Journal of Finance 10, 177-197. 
 
Javorcik, B.S., C. Ozden, M. Spatareanu, and C. Neagu. 2011. "Migrant networks and foreign 
direct investment". Journal of Development Economics94 (2): 231-241.  
Jordan, Alexander, and Alex Lenkoski. "Tobit Bayesian model averaging and the determinants of 
foreign direct investment." arXiv preprint arXiv:1205.2501 (2012). 
 
Kaufmann, Daniel, AartKraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, 2008, “Governance Matters VII: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2007” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4654. 
 
Klibanoff, Peter, Owen Lamont, and Thierry A. Wizman, 1998, “Investor Reaction to Salient News 
in Closed-End Country Funds,” Journal of Finance 53(2), 673-699. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 2008, “The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins,” Journal of Economic Literature 46(2): 285–332. 
 
Langfitt, Frank, 2006, “Economist Magazine Wins American Readers,” NPR.org, March 08, 2006, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5250996, last accessed August 12, 
2015. 
 
Markusen, James R., and Keith E. Maskus, 2002 “Discriminating Among Alternative Theories of 
the Multinational Enterprise,” Review of International Economics 10(4), 694-707. 
 




Globalization: Sovereign Bond Spreads in 1870-1913 and Today. Oxford University Press. 
 
Mondria, Jordi, and Climent Quintana-Domeque, 2007, “Financial contagion through attention 
reallocation: An empirical analysis,” unpublished working paper, University of Toronto. 
 
Nofsinger, John R., 2001, “The Impact of Public Information on Investors,” Journal of Banking 
and Finance 25, 1339-1366. 
 
Onder, Zeynep, and Can Simga-Mugan, 2006, “How do Political and Economic News Affect 
Emerging Markets? Evidence from Argentina and Turkey,” Emerging Markets Finance and 
Trade 42(4), 50-77. 
 
Portes, Richard, and Hélène Rey, 2005, “The Determinants of Cross-Border Equity Flows,” 
Journal of International Economics 65, 269-296. 
 
Portes, Richard, Hélène Rey, and Yonghyup Oh, 2001, “Information and Capital Flows: The 
Determinants of Transactions in Financial Assets,” European Economic Review 45, 783-796. 
 
StataCorp, “ivregress -- Single-equation instrumental-variables regression.” Stata.com, 2013, 
http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rivregress.pdf 
 
Veldkamp, Laura L., 2006, “Media Frenzies in Markets for Financial Information,” American 
Economic Review 96(3), 577-601. 
 
Wheeler, David, and AshokaMody, 1992, “International Investment Location Decisions: The Case 
of US Firms,” Journal of International Economics 33, 57–76. 
 
The World Bank/MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), 2006, “The Investment 
Promotion Agency Performance Review 2006: Providing Information to Investors,” IPA 








TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1A. 
Country Visibility Index, Summary Statistics 
 Variable Mean S.D. Median Min Max 
2002 
153 countries 
News Count 14.65 42.5 3 0 455 
Economic News Count 6.65 19.52 0 0 172 
Political News Count 4.08 10.81 1 0 113 
Social News Count 3.86 14.25 1 0 168 
2003 
138 countries 
News Count 14.56 49.78 2 0 535 
Economic News Count 4.51 14.14 0 0 120 
Political News Count 2.27 6.02 0 0 58 
Social News Count 7.74 31.47 1 0 356 
Note: The countries that are used in the baseline regressions for 2003 (153 countries) and 2004 (138 countries) are included. The US is 
excluded. 
Table 1B. 
Country Visibility Index, Summary Statistics – Excluding the UK 
 Variable Mean S.D. Median Min Max 
2002 
152 countries 
News Count 11.76 22.92 3 0 146 
Economic News Count 5.56 14.18 0 0 112 
Political News Count 3.37 6.21 0 0 41 
Social News Count 2.78 5 1 0 32 
2003 
137 countries 
News Count 10.77 22.15 2 0 131 
Economic News Count 3.66 10.13 0 0 82 
Political News Count 1.86 3.68 0 0 18 
Social News Count 5.20 9.97 1 0 57 
Note: Excluding the UK, other countries that are used in the baseline regressions for 2003 (152 countries) and 2004 (137 countries) are 
included. The US is excluded. 
 
Figure 1.  





Table 2:  
Baseline Estimation Results 







 I-1 I-2 II-1 II-2 
Lagged News Count (in log) 0.402*** 0.377*** 0.347*** 0.328** 
(0.126) (0.136) (0.133) (0.140) 
GDP (in log) 0.600*** 0.610*** 0.624*** 0.630*** 
(0.093) (0.096) (0.098) (0.099) 
Distance (in log) -0.714*** -0.711*** -0.692*** -0.683*** 
(0.163) (0.163) (0.202) (0.203) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.029 -0.029 -0.024 -0.025 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
GDP Per Capita (in log) 0.445*** 0.438*** 0.424*** 0.423*** 
(0.091) (0.092) (0.106) (0.106) 
Negative Flow Dummy 0.652** 0.627* 0.713** 0.692** 
(0.329) (0.334) (0.327) (0.331) 
Negative Flow Dummy * Lagged News Count (in log) -0.442*** -0.425** -0.469*** -0.455*** 
(0.162) (0.166) (0.160) (0.164) 
Time Dummy (for 2004) 0.329* 0.327* 0.350* 0.349* 
(0.184) (0.186) (0.186) (0.187) 
Legal Origin Dummy   0.255 0.247 
  (0.240) (0.241) 
Common Language Dummy   -0.331 -0.344 
  (0.239) (0.242) 
NAFTA Dummy   0.468 0.511 
  (0.447) (0.454) 
EU1 (for 15 original members)   0.430 0.395 
  (0.419) (0.428) 
EU2 (for 10 additional members)   -0.846** -0.848** 
  (0.386) (0.388) 
EU3 (for candidate countries)   -0.306 -0.314 
  (0.483) (0.479) 
Constant -7.986*** -8.156*** -8.552*** -8.724*** 
(2.274) (2.299) (2.506) (2.536) 
Number of observations 291 289 283 281 
R2 0.7 0.691 0.716 0.705 
Note: Huber/White standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10%-level, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the log of the absolute value of the flow of FDI from the US to country i in 2003 and 2004. Lagged News Count is the log 

























Country Income Groups 
Dependent variable:  





Lower-middle and  
Low Income 
Countries 
High and  
Upper-middle Income 
Countries 
 I I-2 II-1 II-2 
Lagged News Count (in log) 0.419** 0.091 0.450** 0.101 
(0.169) (0.275) (0.192) (0.218) 
GDP (in log) 0.591*** 0.642** 0.521*** 0.884*** 
(0.110) (0.322) (0.117) (0.242) 
Distance (in log) -0.861*** 0.547 -0.913*** -0.706* 
(0.237) (0.994) (0.297) (0.429) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.020 -0.277** -0.016 -0.041 
(0.030) (0.112) (0.033) (0.045) 
GDP Per Capita (in log) 0.379*** 1.753*** 0.459*** 0.343 
(0.125) (0.606) (0.173) (0.417) 
Negative Flow Dummy 0.700** 2.550 0.906** 0.411 
(0.354) (1.948) (0.398) (0.716) 
Negative Flow Dummy * Lagged News Count (in 
log) 
-0.489*** -1.464* -0.578** -0.300 
(0.182) (0.826) (0.235) (0.275) 
Time Dummy (for 2004) 0.391* 0.638 0.348 0.354 
(0.204) (0.457) (0.233) (0.323) 
Legal Origin Dummy 0.130 2.122** 0.065 1.116** 
(0.256) (0.940) (0.282) (0.529) 
Common Language Dummy -0.397 -0.487 -0.156 -0.802 
(0.255) (0.656) (0.274) (0.547) 
NAFTA Dummy 0.544 2.352  0.271 
(0.378) (2.613)  (0.977) 
EU1 (for 15 original members)  1.073  0.416 
 (0.709)  (0.586) 
EU2 (for 10 additional members) -0.645 -1.647**  -0.669 
(0.447) (0.712)  (0.446) 
EU3 (for candidate countries) -0.306  -0.231  
(0.504)  (0.546)  
Constant -6.032* -32.971*** -4.598 -13.758*** 
(3.133) (9.394) (3.877) (4.032) 
Number of observations 225 58 177 106 
R2 0.602 0.719 0.551 0.722 








Stories categorized as Economic, Political, and Social 
Dependent variable: FDI (log absolute value) All  Countries 
Lower-middle and 




Low income Countries  I-1 I-2 II-1 II-2 
Lagged Economic News Count (in log) 0.565*** 0.600** 0.562*** 0.597** 
(0.176) (0.262) (0.175) (0.267) 
Lagged Political News Count (in log) 0.030 0.189 0.066 0.210 
(0.207) (0.291) (0.209) (0.293) 
Lagged Social News Count (in log) -0.077 0.055 -0.201 -0.007 
(0.172) (0.252) (0.179) (0.253) 
GDP (in log) 0.607*** 0.440*** 0.645*** 0.488*** 
(0.088) (0.116) (0.092) (0.114) 
Distance (in log) -0.732*** -1.005*** -0.760*** -1.077*** 
(0.162) (0.253) (0.200) (0.299) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.024 -0.014 -0.018 -0.010 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) 
GDP Per Capita (in log) 0.371*** 0.410** 0.330*** 0.335* 
(0.092) (0.173) (0.106) (0.186) 
Negative Flow Dummy 0.343 0.716** 0.364 0.668* 
(0.286) (0.357) (0.288) (0.367) 
Neg. Flow Dummy * Lagged Economic News Count (in log) -0.708** -0.323 -0.663** -0.338 
(0.314) (0.503) (0.308) (0.500) 
Neg. Flow Dummy * Lagged Political News Count (in log) 0.524 0.012 0.419 0.044 
(0.423) (0.609) (0.431) (0.631) 
Neg. Flow Dummy * Lagged Social News Count (in log) -0.256 -0.449 -0.234 -0.439 
(0.321) (0.396) (0.336) (0.413) 
Time Dummy (for 2004) 0.451** 0.464* 0.520** 0.534** 
(0.203) (0.258) (0.209) (0.264) 
Legal Origin Dummy   0.391 0.100   (0.240) (0.271) 
Common Language Dummy   -0.361 -0.164   (0.235) (0.260) 
NAFTA Dummy   0.174    (0.456)  
EU1 (for 15 original members)   0.430    (0.418)  
EU2 (for 10 additional members)   -0.884**    (0.386)  
EU3 (for candidate countries)   -0.309 -0.201   (0.528) (0.641) 
Constant -7.289*** -1.538 -7.610*** -1.490 
(2.271) (3.626) (2.550) (4.127) 
Number of observations 291 183 283 177 
R2 0.711 0.558 0.725 0.568 
See notes to Table 2.Economic, Political, or Social News Counts are defined as the log of the number (plus one) of The Economist’s stories in 






Table 5:  
The IV Estimations (2SLS) 
 All Countries Lower-middle and Low Income Countries All Countries 



































 I-1 I-2 II-1 II-2 III-1 III-2 IV-1 IV-2 
Lagged News Count (in log)  -0.276  1.138**  -0.015  0.365 
 (0.989)  (0.581)  (0.891)  (0.720) 
GDP (in log) 0.548*** 0.977* 0.460*** 0.188 0.514*** 0.829 0.398*** 0.563 
(0.031) (0.561) (0.033) (0.310) (0.045) (0.507) (0.038) (0.354) 
Distance (in log) 0.058 -0.655*** 0.270** -1.114*** 0.080 -0.67*** 0.304** -0.888** 
(0.088) (0.205) (0.113) (0.360) (0.091) (0.207) (0.118) (0.359) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.015* -0.034 -0.019** -0.003 -0.015* -0.030 -0.016* -0.018 
(0.008) (0.034) (0.009) (0.031) (0.008) (0.034) (0.009) (0.036) 
GDP Per Capita (in log) -0.251*** 0.273 -0.150** 0.560*** -0.183*** 0.336 -0.067 0.446** 
(0.045) (0.256) (0.067) (0.172) (0.055) (0.238) (0.070) (0.201) 
Negative Flow Dummy -0.827*** 0.199 -0.918*** 1.543** -0.803*** 0.414 -0.887*** 0.827 
(0.137) (0.874) (0.135) (0.645) (0.137) (0.804) (0.145) (0.774) 
Negative Flow Dummy * 
Lagged News Count (in log) 
0.491*** -0.179 0.577*** -0.959*** 0.460*** -0.300 0.541*** -0.531 
(0.073) (0.475) (0.086) (0.362) (0.072) (0.434) (0.093) (0.447) 
Time Dummy (for 2004) -0.101 0.287 -0.059 0.390 -0.082 0.314 -0.020 0.342 
(0.088) (0.228) (0.102) (0.241) (0.088) (0.201) (0.105) (0.226) 
Legal Origin Dummy 0.321** 0.439 0.107 0.007 0.285** 0.362 0.031 0.072 
(0.137) (0.378) (0.138) (0.285) (0.139) (0.346) (0.136) (0.277) 
Common Language Dummy 0.165 -0.220 0.180 -0.278 0.191 -0.266 0.200 -0.141 
(0.144) (0.306) (0.142) (0.301) (0.143) (0.288) (0.138) (0.302) 
NAFTA Dummy 0.506** 0.834   0.518** 0.681   
(0.235) (0.719)   (0.214) (0.688)   
EU1 (for 15 original members) 0.259 0.630   0.323 0.546   
(0.224) (0.517)   (0.217) (0.483)   
EU2 (for 10 additional 
members) 
0.179 -0.719   0.233 -0.772*   
(0.160) (0.449)   (0.147) (0.445)   
EU3 (for candidate countries) -0.279 -0.482 -0.367 -0.025 -0.277 -0.408 -0.274 -0.257 
(0.429) (0.525) (0.480) (0.702) (0.408) (0.480) (0.435) (0.543) 
IV: Total Medal Counts in 
2002 Winter Olympics (in log)   
0.143*  0.347***      
(0.086)  (0.129)      
IV: Lagged Number of Natural 
Disaster Incidents (in log) 
    0.177*  0.275***  
    (0.093)  (0.086)  
Constant -9.989*** -15.061 -10.528*** 3.156 -10.06*** -12.334 -10.25*** -5.563 
(0.933) (10.457) (1.438) (8.136) (0.977) (9.628) (1.421) (8.697) 
Number of observations 283 283 177 177 283 283 177 177 
R2 0.745 0.692 0.7 0.511 0.746 0.708 0.706 0.551 







The IV Estimations (Optimal Two-step GMM) 











(log absolute value) 
 I-1 I-2 II-1 II-2 
Lagged News Count (in log)  -0.138  0.846** 
 (0.649)  (0.428) 
GDP (in log) 0.498*** 0.899** 0.383*** 0.337 
(0.046) (0.370) (0.039) (0.232) 
Distance (in log) 0.078 -0.660*** 0.283** -1.014*** 
(0.090) (0.202) (0.117) (0.324) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.013 -0.033 -0.016* -0.007 
(0.008) (0.032) (0.009) (0.032) 
GDP Per Capita (in log) -0.193*** 0.306* -0.076 0.539*** 
(0.054) (0.182) (0.070) (0.167) 
Negative Flow Dummy -0.806*** 0.312 -0.882*** 1.294** 
(0.136) (0.625) (0.142) (0.541) 
Negative Flow Dummy * Lagged News Count 
(in log) 
0.485*** -0.243 0.561*** -0.812*** 
(0.073) (0.326) (0.091) (0.300) 
Time Dummy (for 2004) -0.083 0.306 -0.020 0.352 
(0.088) (0.201) (0.104) (0.228) 
Legal Origin Dummy 0.312** 0.398 0.055 0.013 
(0.138) (0.299) (0.136) (0.273) 
Common Language Dummy 0.178 -0.244 0.202 -0.236 
(0.143) (0.271) (0.137) (0.284) 
NAFTA Dummy 0.440** 0.756   
(0.216) (0.575)   
EU1 (for 15 original members) 0.263 0.585   
(0.226) (0.448)   
EU2 (for 10 additional members) 0.208 -0.739*   
(0.157) (0.423)   
EU3 (for candidate countries) -0.274 -0.435 -0.335 -0.136 
(0.426) (0.456) (0.470) (0.629) 
IV: Total Medal Counts in 2002 Winter 
Olympics (in log)   
0.140*  0.305**  
(0.083)  (0.125)  
IV: Lagged Number of Natural Disaster 
Incidents (in log) 
0.174*  0.255***  
(0.093)  (0.086)  
Constant -9.620*** -13.641* -9.663*** -0.583 
(0.984) (7.124) (1.463) (6.264) 
Number of observations 283 283 177 177 
R2 0.75 0.702 0.714 0.538 
The p-value for Hansen's (1982) J-statistic  84.5%  41.5% 
See notes to Table 2. The first stage results, reported in columns I-1 and II-1, are used to form the weighting matrix for the optimal two-









IS “NO NEWS” REALLY “GOOD NEWS”? 
COUNTRY VISIBILITY AND FDI LOCATION CHOICE 
 
In this appendix, we first report the baseline estimation results (as given by Equation 1) 
controlling for a wide range of institutional variables. Then, we report the results of a robustness 
check where we only include observations for which the absolute value of FDI inflows or outflows 
are less than or equal to the value of the 90th percentile. We also report the result of another test 
where we include variations in armed conflicts to examine if events that may lead to news stories 
with potentially negative tones have any negative impact on the FDI flows.  
Further, we include a full list of variable definitions and data sources. We also include a 
full list of countries that are used in this study. Lastly, we provide example stories from The 
Economist, along with their classification for the visibility index. 
Institutional Considerations 
A variety of institutional variables that may capture the costs of investing abroad, the role 
of political systems, and the quality of governance are likely to be among the important 
determinants of firms’ decisions to invest abroad. However, the empirical evidence on the effect 
of institutional variables on FDI is mixed. For example, Aizenman and Spiegel (2006) focus on a 
measure of institutional inefficiency (using an index of bureaucracy) and find that higher levels of 
institutional inefficiency have a significant negative impact on the share of FDI in gross fixed 
capital formation. Yet, Daude and Fratzscher (2008) suggest that, although portfolio investments 
are relatively sensitive, FDI appears to be insensitive to the quality of institutions in the host 
country.  
We explore the inclusion of a number of institutional variables. While these variables may 
be important additional controls, they may not show up as significant in our regressions due to the 
2 
 
large vector of controls, which include the standard gravity covariates. We incorporate 5 types of 
institutional variables that have been considered in a wide range of previous literature, including 
measures of economic freedom (from the Heritage Foundation), civil liberties (from Freedom 
House), political risk (from the International Country Risk Guide), trade openness (measured as 
the sum of exports and imports relative to real GDP per capita), and governance (from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators).  
Table A1 shows the results of including a variety of institutional variables, as well as trade 
openness, which is often used in the trade literature on FDI to indicate the amount of trade flows 
as a proxy for trade barriers. In each case, we add the institutional variable along with the 
explanatory variables included in the baseline regression. The results reported in Table A1 suggest 
that in most cases the institutional variables included are not significant on their own. Greater trade 
openness is associated with greater FDI activities as shown in column V. The estimated effect is, 
in fact, highly significant, but does not change the relationship between news and FDI activity.   
Incorporating the cross-section institutional differences does not change the pattern that we 
find in the data: conditional upon a wide range of covariates, which include institutional variables, 
greater country visibility is associated with greater FDI outflow from the US to other countries. In 
fact, institutional variables appear to have little impact on the sign, size, and significance of the 
coefficient on our country visibility index, with the coefficient on Lagged News Count remaining 
in the 0.245 to 0.399 range. The effect of greater country visibility on the FDI reversals, as 
estimated by the sum of coefficients on Lagged News Count and Negative Flow Dummy * Lagged 
News Count, continues to be insignificant.1 
                                                          
1Including the institutional variables in the vector of control covariates, we estimate the model for the FDI data for 2003 and 2004 
separately. Trade openness is again the only significant institutional determinant. Though in some cases the estimated coefficient 
of interest is not as significant, in most cases we find it to be statistically significant. It also remains in the same range as the 
estimated parameter of interest as reported in Table A1. Detailed estimation results available upon request. 
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Table A1:  
Including Institutional Control Covariates 
Dependent variable:  
FDI (log absolute value) I II III IV V VI 
Lagged News Count (in log) 0.347*** 0.245* 0.333** 0.305** 0.399*** 0.307** 
(0.133) (0.142) (0.135) (0.155) (0.132) (0.136) 
GDP (in log) 0.624*** 0.692*** 0.637*** 0.662*** 0.759*** 0.646*** 
(0.098) (0.125) (0.101) (0.140) (0.120) (0.097) 
Distance (in log) -0.692*** -0.849*** -0.698*** -0.943*** -0.984*** -0.641*** 
(0.202) (0.212) (0.203) (0.236) (0.237) (0.209) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.024 0.011 -0.023 -0.036 -0.072** -0.025 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) 
GDP Per Capita (in log) 0.424*** 0.408*** 0.408*** 0.344** 0.152 0.499*** 
(0.106) (0.146) (0.120) (0.140) (0.124) (0.157) 
Negative Flow Dummy 0.713** 0.479 0.623* 0.161 0.950*** 0.613* 
(0.327) (0.330) (0.329) (0.342) (0.354) (0.322) 
Negative Flow Dummy * Lagged News 
Count (in log) 
-0.469*** -0.388** -0.444*** -0.267(a) -0.466*** -0.443*** 
(0.160) (0.154) (0.162) (0.167) (0.153) (0.163) 
Time Dummy (for 2004) 0.350* 0.339* 0.370** 0.411** 0.815*** 0.354* 
(0.186) (0.195) (0.185) (0.208) (0.217) (0.188) 
Legal Origin Dummy 0.255 0.346 0.275 0.546* 0.401* 0.293 
(0.240) (0.242) (0.240) (0.279) (0.239) (0.238) 
Common Language Dummy -0.331 -0.234 -0.329 -0.293 -0.405 -0.284 
(0.239) (0.268) (0.245) (0.311) (0.255) (0.247) 
NAFTA Dummy 0.468 0.045 0.532 -0.025 -0.223 0.652 
(0.447) (0.535) (0.454) (0.582) (0.512) (0.475) 
EU1 (for 15 original members) 0.430 0.268 0.534 0.458 0.129 0.650 
(0.419) (0.406) (0.443) (0.474) (0.371) (0.488) 
EU2 (for 10 additional members) -0.846** -0.985** -0.760* -0.792* -1.388*** -0.669 
(0.386) (0.421) (0.404) (0.431) (0.424) (0.418) 
EU3 (for candidate countries) -0.306 -0.289 -0.275 -0.265 -0.518 -0.279 
(0.483) (0.476) (0.497) (0.467) (0.426) (0.493) 
Economic Freedom  0.017     
 (0.016)     
Civil Liberties   0.027    
  (0.092)    
ICRG    0.002   
   (0.016)   
Trade Openness     0.013***  
    (0.003)  
WGI Score      -0.237 
     (0.290) 
Constant  -8.552*** -9.621*** -8.771*** -6.643** -8.005*** -10.090*** 
(2.506) (2.709) (2.534) (2.985) (2.975) (2.872) 
Number of observations 283 253 281 229 204 282 
R2 0.716 0.725 0.718 0.707 0.777 0.719 
See notes to Table 2 and variable definitions in text. We use ICRG and WGI Score for the year 2003 assuming that they are unchanged in 2004. 
Other institutional variables are observed for 2003 and 2004.  
Note: a) P-value=0.11 
 
Excluding Large FDI Flows 
Motivated by a point raised by an anonymous referee, we conduct a robustness check on 
the baseline estimations. In this robustness check, we only include observations for which the 
absolute value of FDI inflows or outflows are less than or equal to the value of the 90th 
percentile. The results remain intact.  
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The countries with FDI inflows or outflows greater than the 90th percentile value, which 
are excluded from the full sample in our robustness checks, are the usual suspects. The list 
includes Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
UK. The result of the estimation using the smaller sample, reported in Table A2 (column I-1), 
are in line with the baseline results using the full sample: conditional upon a wide range of 
covariates, greater country visibility contributes to FDI flow from the U.S. to other countries in 
the smaller sample, but it has no significant effect on the reversal of such flows from those 
countries to the US.  
We then turn to the sub-sample of lower middle and low income countries. Excluding the 
destinations with large flows, country visibility remains a significant determinant of direct 
investment from the US to developing countries. From the sub-sample of lower middle and low 
income countries, we only include observations for which the absolute value of FDI inflows or 
outflows are less than or equal to the value of the 90th percentile. The countries that are dropped 
from this sub-sample include: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, India, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and Thailand. The 
result of the estimation using the smaller sub-sample, reported in column I-2, are in line with the 
baseline results using all developing countries. While the estimated parameter for Lagged News 
Counts is statistically greater than zero, the sum of the estimated parameter of Lagged News 
Counts and Negative Flow Dummy * Lagged News Count is statistically not different from zero 
(p-value=42.28%). GDP, GDP per capita, and distance are also among the significant 
determinants of FDI flows. This result implies that, conditional upon a wide range of covariates, 
greater country visibility contributes to FDI flow from the U.S. to developing countries in the 
5 
 
smaller sub-sample, but it has no significant effect on the reversal of such flows from those 
countries to the U.S.   
We finally turn to the sub-sample of high and upper middle income countries. Excluding 
the destinations with large flows, country visibility has no significant effect on direct investment 
from the US to developed countries. From the sub-sample of high and upper middle income 
countries, we only include observations for which the absolute value of FDI inflows or outflows 
are less than or equal to the value of the 90th percentile. The countries that are dropped from this 
sub-sample include: Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and 
the UK. The results, reported column I-3, imply that greater country visibility has no significant 
effect on FDI flows between the US and the remaining countries in the sub-sample of high and 
upper middle income countries. 
The findings of this robustness test are in line with our baseline findings, suggesting that 





Robustness Test for Baseline Estimations – Excluding Large FDI Flowsa 
Dependent variable:  
FDI (log absolute value) 
All 
Countries 
Lower-middle and  
Low Income 
Countries 
High and  
Upper-middle 
Income Countries 
 I-1 I-2 I-3 
Lagged News Count (in log) 0.324** 0.363* 0.0411 
 (0.144) (0.209) (0.235) 
GDP (in log) 0.632*** 0.401*** 0.869*** 
 (0.1000) (0.121) (0.253) 
Distance (in log) -0.821*** -1.202*** -0.626 
 (0.214) (0.288) (0.506) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.0206 -0.0258 -0.0218 
 (0.0300) (0.0317) (0.0447) 
GDP Per Capita (in log) 0.312*** 0.240b 0.184 
 (0.109) (0.167) (0.444) 
Negative Flow Dummy 0.718** 1.093** 0.394 
 (0.336) (0.434) (0.758) 
Negative Flow Dummy * Lagged News Count (in log) -0.399** -0.535** -0.241 
 (0.172) (0.263) (0.307) 
Time Dummy (for 2004) 0.324* 0.194 0.225 
 (0.194) (0.224) (0.348) 
Legal Origin Dummy 0.253 0.170 1.271** 
 (0.253) (0.266) (0.565) 
Common Language Dummy -0.426* -0.211 -1.084* 
 (0.242) (0.259) (0.644) 
NAFTA Dummy   0.679c 
   (0.836) 
EU1 (for 15 original members) -0.264  0.556 
 (0.456)  (0.676) 
EU2 (for 10 additional members) -0.626  -0.629 
 (0.397)  (0.478) 
EU3 (for candidate countries) -0.178 0.723  
 (0.471) (0.516)  
Constant -6.813*** 2.051 -12.73*** 
 (2.573) (3.995) (4.227) 
Number of observations 253 158 94 
R2 0.593 0.451 0.659 
Note: a) From each reference sample, the observations for which the absolute value of FDI inflows or 
outflows are less than or equal to the value of the 90th percentile are included in the above regressions; b) In 
this case, the p-value is 15.3%; c) In the sub-sample of high and upper middle income countries, the FDI 
flow to Mexico in 2003 is included. This is done because its value in that year is less or equal to the 90th 
percentile. In 2004, however, FDI flow to Mexico is excluded, as its value in that year is greater than the 90th 
percentile. That is why NAFTA dummy is included in the regression function. 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Armed Conflicts 
As indicated in the manuscript, we find it a subjective matter to assign negative or 
positive tone to a given news story. In practice, a given news story may be considered negative 
for some firms, while the same story may be considered positive for some other firms. Plus, there 
are often news stories that explore different aspects of a given event, which makes it again 
impossible for us to assign a negative, positive, or neutral tone to the story. To avoid any 
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measurement error, we focused on the counts (i.e., how many times a given country appears in 
The Economist) and the type of news stories (i.e., economic, political, or social). 
Motivated by the point raised by an anonymous referee, we conduct a new test to explore 
whether the presence of armed conflicts in a given country, which may potentially lead to some 
news stories with negative tone, may affect the way that country visibility contributes to FDI 
flows. Conditional upon a wide range of covariates, we find no evidence of such effect.  
We employ UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, collected by the Conflict Data 
Program at Uppsala University and Peace Research Institute in Oslo, to identify the countries 
that have had armed conflict in 2002 and 2003. This dataset is an extension of the data collection 
by Gleditsch et al. (2002).  
We estimate the parameters of a linear regression function in which absolute value of FDI 
flows (in log) is used as dependent variable and lagged number of news stories (in log) is used as 
independent variable along with the other covariates (GDP, distance, GDP growth rate, GDP per 
capita) and a vector of dummy variables that we use in previous regression functions. We add a 
dummy variable for lagged armed conflict and an interaction term between lagged armed conflict 
and lagged number of news stories. For countries with no lagged armed conflict, the parameter 
associated with Lagged News Counts (in log) captures the effect of country visibility on FDI 
flows. For countries with lagged armed conflict, the sum of the parameters associated with 
Lagged News Counts (in log) and Conflict Dummy * Lagged News Count (in log) captures the 
effect of country visibility on FDI flows.  
The results, reported in Table A3, suggest that in countries where there were no lagged 
conflicts, the effect of country visibility on FDI flows remains essentially the same: greater 
country visibility contributes to FDI flows. In the results reported in column I-2, where 
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observations from all countries are employed, the estimated parameter for Lagged News Count 
(in log) is positive and statistically different from zero. We observe almost the same pattern for 
countries where there were some lagged conflicts reported. The sum of the parameters associated 
with Lagged News Counts (in log) and Conflict Dummy * Lagged News Count (in log) is 
statistically different from zero, though the p-value is slightly above the conventional level (p-
value=11.08%). In the results reported in column II-2, where observations from developing 
countries are employed, the parameter associated with Lagged News Counts (in log) is 
statistically different from zero, though the p-value is slightly above the conventional level (p-
value=15.4%). However, the sum of the parameters associated with Lagged News Counts (in log) 
and Conflict Dummy * Lagged News Count (in log) is statistically not different from zero (p-
value=20.26%).  
It should be noted that the results reported in column I-1 and II-1 of Table A3 are a bit 
different from the baseline results reported in Table 2 of the revised manuscript. The reason is 
that Negative Flow Dummy and Negative Flow Dummy * Lagged News Count (in log), which are 
included in baseline regressions to capture the effect of country visibility on the reversal of 
flows, are excluded from the regression function for this test. That is why the precision of the 
parameter associated with Lagged News Counts (in log) is affected a bit. That said, an interesting 
pattern emerges, which suggest that events that may potentially lead to news stories with 
negative tones may have no effect on FDI flows for developing countries. It is also important to 
note that we find no reversal of sign for this result. Thus, we can only conclude that for 
developing countries there is not a significant positive effect on FDI flows for these types of 




















 I-1 I-2 II-1 II-2 
Lagged News Count (in log) 0.243** 0.224* 0.280* 0.246b 
 (0.120) (0.126) (0.163) (0.172) 
GDP (in log) 0.649*** 0.648*** 0.573*** 0.569*** 
 (0.0967) (0.0974) (0.109) (0.110) 
Distance (in log) -0.673*** -0.670*** -0.917*** -0.912*** 
 (0.203) (0.203) (0.297) (0.297) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.0245 -0.0243 -0.0142 -0.0141 
 (0.0307) (0.0301) (0.0356) (0.0349) 
GDP Per Capita (in log) 0.402*** 0.413*** 0.406** 0.428** 
 (0.107) (0.112) (0.174) (0.183) 
Time Dummy (for 2004) 0.365* 0.359* 0.367 0.365 
 (0.185) (0.186) (0.233) (0.236) 
Legal Origin Dummy 0.207 0.189 0.0163 0.00328 
 (0.247) (0.252) (0.291) (0.293) 
Common Language Dummy -0.285 -0.288 -0.103 -0.113 
 (0.248) (0.250) (0.289) (0.292) 
NAFTA Dummy 0.670 0.732   
 (0.431) (0.451)   
EU1 (for 15 original members) 0.525 0.536   
 (0.407) (0.410)   
EU2 (for 10 additional members) -0.814** -0.803**   
 (0.391) (0.397)   
EU3 (for candidate countries) -0.325 -0.386 -0.256 -0.339 
 (0.444) (0.481) (0.491) (0.536) 
Lagged Armed Conflict Dummy  0.0486  0.0664 
  (0.526)  (0.586) 
Conflict Dummy * Lagged News Count (in log)  0.0513  0.0739 
  (0.165)  (0.236) 
Constant -8.967*** -9.047*** -5.132 -5.217 
 (2.493) (2.479) (3.826) (3.825) 
P-value for the sum of parameters associated 
with Lagged News Count and Conflict Dummy * 





Number of observations 283 283 177 177 
R2 0.710 0.710 0.537 0.538 
Note: a) The estimated parameter reported in this column follow the same pattern as the estimated parameter reported in baseline 
regressions, reported in Table 2 of the manuscript. Since Negative Flow Dummy and Negative Flow Dummy * Lagged News 
Count (in log), which are included in baseline regressions, are excluded from the regression function for this test, the magnitude 
of the estimated parameters may be a bit different.; b) In this case, the p-value is equal to 15.4%. 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Variable Definitions, Data Sources, and Country List 
Tables A4, A5, A6, and A7 provide the definition of variables that are used in our baseline 
estimations, IV estimations, institutional considerations, and the test using armed conflict, 
respectively.  These tables also include the data sources. Table A8 includes a full list of countries 
used in this study.  
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Table A4  
Variables, Definitions, and Sources 
Variable Name Variable Definition Source 
News Count 
(2002 and 2003) 





(2003 and 2004) 
FDI outflow measure provided by the BEA. 
 
Equity capital flows are net flows, where “equity capital outflows occur when 
a U.S. parent increases its equity investment in one of its existing foreign 
affiliates or makes a new equity investment in a foreign business enterprise, 
either by acquiring an existing foreign business or by establishing a new one. 
Equity capital inflows occur when a U.S. parent reduces its equity interest in 
an existing affiliate. Intercompany debt flows are of two types: U.S.-parent 
receivables and U.S.-parent payables. U.S.-parent receivables represent loans 
that a U.S. parent extends to its foreign affiliate. An outflow on U.S.-parent 
receivables occurs when the parent extends a new loan to its affiliate; an 
inflow occurs when an affiliate repays part or all of a loan from its U.S. 
parent. U.S.-parent payables represent loans that a foreign affiliate extends to 
its U.S. parent. An outflow on U.S.-parent payables occurs when the parent 
repays part or all of a loan from its foreign affiliate; an inflow occurs when 
an affiliate extends a new loan to its U.S. parent. Reinvested earnings are the 
U.S. parents’ claim on the undistributed after-tax earnings of its foreign 
affiliate.” 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
www.bea.gov 
See the BEA definitions: 
http://www.bea.gov/scb/account_articles/
international/0395iid/maintext.htm  
GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0FSM7AQ40 
GDPgrowth rate GDP growth (annual %) World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0FSM7AQ40 
Population Population, total World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0FSM7AQ40 
Income groups Economies are divided according to 2002 GNI per capita, calculated using 
the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $735 or less; 
lower middle income, $736- $2,935; upper middle income, $2,936- $9,075; 




Distance “Geodesic distances are calculated following the great circle formula, which 











UK legal origin. http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/fac
ulty/rafael.laporta/publications.html  
Nafta Membership in Nafta. U.S., Canada, Mexico 
EU1 EU15 Member States: Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
European Union Membership based on 
date of entry. 
http://europa.eu/abc/history/2000_today/i
ndex_en.html  
EU2 New Member States (May 2004): Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
 




Table A5  
Instrumental Variables: Definitions, and Sources 
Olympic 
Medals 
Medal counts for Summer Olympics (Sydney 2000). 
 
International Olympics Committee 
Natural 
Disasters 
Number of natural disaster incidents in a country in 2002 and 2003. Center for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters, School of 
Public Health at Universitecatholique 
de Louvain. http://www.cred.be/  
 
Table A6  
Institutional Variables: Definitions, and Sources 
Economic 
Freedom (EF) 
We use the simple average of 9 individual freedoms: business freedom, trade 
freedom, monetary freedom, freedom from government, fiscal freedom, property 
rights, investment freedom, financial freedom, and freedom from corruption (a 
10th component, labor freedom was added in 2005).A higher score indicates 
greater economic freedom. 
Heritage Foundation Index of 
Economic Freedom 
www.heritage.org  
ICRG We use the overall measure, which is a weighted combination of 12 components, 
with higher numbers indicating lower risk: Government Stability (12 pts), 
Socioeconomic Stability (12 pts), Investment Profile (12 pts), Internal Conflict 
(12 pts), External Conflict (12 pts), Corruption (6 pts), Military in Politics (6 
pts), Religion in Politics (6 pts), Law and Order (6 pts), Ethnic Tensions (6 pts), 
Democratic Accountability (6 pts), Bureaucracy Quality (4 pts) 
International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG)  
www.icrgonline.com  
Civil Liberties Political Rights (“PR”) and Civil Liberties (“CL”) are measured on a one-to-
seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of Freedom and seven the 
lowest. 
Freedom House, Freedom in the 




(Exports + Imports)/(real GDP per capita) Penn World Tables 
WGI Score The six dimensions of governance are constructed using an unobserved 
components methodology described in Kaufmann et al. (2008). The six 
governance indicators are measured in units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with 
higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. The six dimensions 
are: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability & Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of 
Law, and Control of Corruption. 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
www.govindicators.org  
 
Table A7  
Armed Conflict: Definition, and Source 
Conflict 
Dummy 
This dummy variable is based on armed conflict information. For 2002 and 
2003, we assign value one to a given country provided that at least one armed 
conflict is reported for that country. Otherwise, we assign zero. 









Table A8:  
Country List 
Albania Cyprus Kyrgyzstan Russia 
Algeria Czech Republic Laos Rwanda 
Angola Denmark Latvia Samoa 
Antigua Djibouti Lebanon Saudi Arabia 
Argentina Dominican Republic Lesotho Senegal 
Armenia Ecuador Liberia Serbia Montenegro 
Aruba Egypt Libya Sierra Leone 
Australia El Salvador Luxembourg Singapore 
Austria Equatorial Guinea Macedonia Slovak Republic 
Azerbaijan Eritrea Madagascar Slovenia 
Bahrain Estonia Malawi Solomon Islands 
Bangladesh Ethiopia Malaysia South Africa 
Belarus Finland Maldives Spain 
Belgium Fiji Marshall Islands Sri Lanka 
Belize France Mauritania St. Kitts Nevis 
Benin Gabon Mauritius St. Vincent Grenadines 
Bhutan Gambia Mexico Sudan 
Bolivia Georgia Moldova Suriname 
Bosnia Herzegovina Germany Mongolia Sweden 
Botswana Ghana Morocco Switzerland 
Brazil Greece Mozambique Tajikistan 
Brunei Grenada Namibia Tanzania 
Bulgaria Guatemala Nepal Thailand 
Burkina Faso Guyana Netherlands Togo 
Burundi Haiti New Zealand Tonga 
Cambodia Honduras Nicaragua Trinidad Tobago 
Cameroon Hong Kong Niger Tunisia 
Canada Hungary Nigeria Turkey 
Central African Republic Iceland Norway Uganda 
Chad India Oman Ukraine 
Chile Iran Pakistan United Arab Emirates 
China Ireland Panama United Kingdom 
Colombia Israel Papua New Guinea Uruguay 
Comoros Italy Paraguay Uzbekistan 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Jamaica Peru Venezuela 
Congo, Republic of Japan Philippines Vietnam 
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Poland Yemen 
Cote d`Ivoire Kenya Portugal Zambia 
Croatia Korea, Republic of Romania Zimbabwe 





Example Stories and Classification within the Visibility Index 
 
Norway's far north 
What about rights for reindeer? 
The Sami people are unhappy  
Oct 3rd 2002 | KARASJOK, ARCTIC NORWAY | From the print edition 
 OVER the past decade, Norwegians have earned a reputation as peacemakers: in Guatemala, for a 
while in the Middle East, now in Sri Lanka. Yet they are still to sort out an ethnic squabble of 
their own, between Norway's fair-haired 4.5m majority and its 45,000-strong Sami minority up in 
the Arctic. 
 Categorized as Norway – Political 
 
 
AIDS and South African business 
Strategic caring 
Firms strategise about AIDS  
Oct 3rd 2002 | johannesburg | From the print edition 
 GREATER transparency for American firms may mean little more than describing what 
outlandish perks the boss gets. In South Africa, the disclosures will make much grimmer reading. 
Johannesburg's stock exchange is currently “considering what form of accounting standard is 
needed from listed companies”. Translated: in six months, firms listed on the exchange will 
probably be required to publish anti-AIDS policies. Before long, they will have to spell out how 
AIDS affects their business, markets and workers, and show how they are fighting it.  
 Categorized as South Africa – Economic; Social 
 
Bank reform in Japan 
The Takenaka challenge 
A new regulator, but will he wield a new broom?  
Oct 3rd 2002 | Tokyo | From the print edition 
 IS THIS the start of genuine reform, or a bad-dream repeat of 1998-99, when hopes were also 
raised only to be dashed? The prime minister's dismissal on September 30th of Hakuo 
Yanagisawa, the minister who was supposed to be sorting out Japan's rotten banks, surprised 
many. The move, the main feature of Junichiro Koizumi's first cabinet reshuffle since he took 
office last year, seems to offer a chance to speed up bank reform. 
 Categorized as Japan – Economic 
 
Mexico's film industry 
The Mexicans are coming! 
Americans take to Mexico's movies  
Oct 3rd 2002 | mexico city | From the print edition 
 AMERICANS have developed a taste for many things Mexican, including tacos, salsa and maids. 
But the latest successful Mexican export is more surprising: arty films. Over the past few years, 
Mexico's film industry has enjoyed a small renaissance. Americans have started to take note. 
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